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CLARENCE THOMAS AND ADMEISATIVE LAW
William Funk 1
When Justice Souter was nominated to the Supreme Court,
despite his more than 200 written opinions, he was considered a judicial
unknown, especially with respect to administrative law. And it would be no insult
to Justice Souter to say that his service in the New Hampshire Attorney General's
office and as both a trial and appellate state court judge gave him virtually no
exposure to federal administrative law.
Clarence Thomas, on the other hand, may have more
administrative law expertise than any justice, with the possible exception of Justice
Scalia. He has served both in a traditional executive branch agency (Assistant
Secretary of Education for Civil Rights) and on a multi-member commission, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He was chairman of the
EEOC for eight years, so he is well acquainted with the political and judicial
constraints under which agencies labor.
Even in his short stint on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Thomas has
made a mark on administrative law. For example, his one dissent and two
concurrences involved administrative law cases. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v.
FERC, 926 F.2d 1206 (1991), Judge Stephen Williams wrote the opinion, in which
Judge Wald concurred, finding for the second time that a FERC determined rate
of return on equity for a gas pipeline deviated from FERC precedent without a
reasoned explanation. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to FERC. While
Judge Thomas concurred wholeheartedly in the finding of FERC's
unreasonableness, he concurred "only reluctantly" with the relief afforded. The
pipeline had requested that the court itself establish the rate of return rather than
remanding for a second time. Judge Thomas, unlike the majority, took this
request seriously in light of FERC's recalcitrance and delay, referring to Greyhound
Corp. v. ICC, 668 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the court directed the
outcome rather than remand for a second time on the same issue. Ultimately,
however, he conduded that "Greyhound inevitably entails some judicial usurpation
of agency authority[, and so] must be reserved for truly extraordinary situations."
In Cross-Sound Ferry v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327 (1991), the court
unanimously upheld, against a competitor's challenge, the ICC's determination
that certain water carrier services provided by Viking Starship were exempt ferry
services under the Interstate Commerce Act. The majority also ruled that the ICC
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had not violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA) by not considering environmental effects in
making that determination. Judge Thomas, however, wrote separately to argue
that the competitor did not have Artide III standing to raise the NEPA or CZMA
issues. He conceded that the competitor would be harmed by the ICC's
determination that Viking was exempt from ICC regulation, but he indicated that,
even if the ICC considered environmental effects, the ICC still would have been
unable to exerdse jurisdiction over Viking, so the competitor could not obtain
relief. The majority found the standing issue difficult, because the law was not
dear in its view that the ICC could not exercise jurisdiction over Viking in order to
protect the environment. On the other hand, the majority found the merits of
the NEPA and CZMA daims simple, so relying on certain precedents, it believed
it could decide the merits against the competitor without resolving the standing
issue. Judge Thomas strongly disagreed with the majority on this approach and
on its reading of precedent, writing a scholarly essay on the absolute nature of
the requirement to resolve jurisdictional issues prior to the merits.
In his dissent, Doe v. Sullivan, __ F.2d - (1991), Judge
Thomas again reflected his strict construction of jurisdictional requirements. In this
case, the Food and Drug Administration had enacted a rule allowing the military
to apply for a waiver of certain requirements applicable to the investigational use
of drugs if combat conditions justified their use. The rule was adopted in
response to hostilities in the Middle East, and a waiver was granted to the use of
certain unapproved drugs as antidotes to possible Iraqi gas attacks. A soldier
serving in the Gulf challenged the rule and waiver. By the time the case reached
the Court of Appeals, however, the war was over and the waiver had been
terminated. Nonetheless, the majority addressed the fadal attack on the rule,
upholding the rule, because the rule was capable of being used again but
evading review. Judge Thomas dissented, believing the case moot and not to fit
within the category of exceptional cases where the completed action is likely to
be repeated but evade review.
In one of his last opinions, Judge Thomas rejected NEPA claims
brought by a citizens' group against the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
approval of an expansion of the Toledo, Ohio, airport. See Ciizens Against
Burlington v. Busey, _ F.2d ._ (1991). The opinion reflects substantial hostility
to judidally imposed delays of agency action because of NEPA violations, saying
"Just as NEPA is not a green Magna Carta, federal judges are not the barons at
Runnymede."
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There were a number of problems with the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) prepared for the FAA. First, the FAA had violated the
Council on Environmental Quality's regulations by allowing the person seeking the
approval to select the contractor who prepared the EIS, and the contractor failed
to compete properly the conflict of interest forms. The court, however, said these
were harmless errors, or at least not a basis for invalidating the EIS. Second, EPA,
which is responsible for reviewing EISs, had found fault with some of the
methodology of the EIS. The court, however, said the FAA, not EPA, was
responsible for the EIS, so the court accepted the FAA's condusion that the
methodology was proper, even though the FAA acceded to EPA's complaints and
agreed to change its methodology in the future. Third, the EIS only evaluated
two alternatives-a no action alternative and the alternative sought by the permit
applicant-despite the legal requirement to consider all 'feasible" alternatives. The
majority did not believe the FAA needed to consider the alternative of expanding
other airports, because that was not a 'feasible" alternative available to the
applicant, the Toledo Airport Authority, or to the FAA, which could only approve
or disapprove applications presented to it.
This crabbed interpretation of the FAA's duty to evaluate
alternatives, which the majority conceded was inconsistent with Van Abbema v.
Fomell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986), aroused Judge Buckley to dissent. To
observers sympathetic to the use of NEPA to challenge governmental permit
actions, the case is disheartening because all the evidence suggested that the FAA
had not seriously considered the environment at all, with the EIS merely a paper
exercise delegated to others.
Judge Thomas also appeared to reflect conservative credentials
in New York Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002 (1990), an en banc FOIA case
seeking a copy of the recording of the last words of the Challenger astronauts.
There the court split 6-5 upholding the FOI denial, with the majority made up
entirely of post-1 981 appointments and the dissent made up entirely of pre-1981
appointments.
In his other cases, Judge Thomas did not appear to subject
agency action to any "hard look." In two different coal mining cases, for example,
Judge Thomas wrote opinions upholding the Department of Labor's actions: in
one modifying a mandatory safety standard for coal mines over the objection of
the union, Intemational Union, UMW v. FMSHA, 931 F.2d 908 (1991); in the
other citing as an "operator" of a mine an elevator company that serviced coal
mine elevators under contract, O6s Elevator Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 921 F.2d
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1285 (1990). In Buongiomo v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 504 (1990), Judge Thomas
rejected a facal challenge to an HHS regulation governing the circumstances
under which HHS will waive the service or repayment obligations of a scholarship
recipient under the National Health Service Corps. The challenge asserted that the
HHS regulation incorrectly interpreted the governing statute. Judge Thomas
applied Chevron and conduded that 'whether or not the Secretary's interpretation
is 'particularly compelling,' we hold that it is not 'patently inconsistent with the
statutory scheme."' Finally, in Rederi v. FMC, - F.2d - (1991), Judge
Thomas upheld that the FMC's action, because its interpretation of ambiguous
terms in a contract was not unreasonable.
